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## THE BASIS OF NATIONAL SECURITY

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All America is united by common interests which are clearly defined and distinct from that of other nations. While we all recognize this fact, the principles involved are so imperfectly worked out that we fail to see either the grandeur of our culture or its defects. The traditional, the tribal and the battle cries of particular epochs get an emphasis out of all proportion to their importance. They cause us to submerge general principles and lofty ideals under the chaff and débris of fresh emotional outbursts.

This culture is not a homogeneous growth based on home experience, but is the product of foreign thought consciously imported and yet made vital to us by our own experience. We are thus prevented from seeing the essence of these importations and thus separating its husk from its kernel. Our early culture came in the form of Christianity, whose basal concepts are brother love, sacrifice, conscience and charity. There are, however, two varieties of Christianity—the pure and the composite. Organized Christianity has through the centuries received impure currents of thought from outside influences; as a result it is possible to give an interpretation of it that makes the foreign elements overshadow the real essence of our culture. The old and the foreign have not been displaced even by the radical reformer. We find, therefore, a political admixture that becomes dominant whenever state needs dominate over spiritual ends. Peace in the one sense is meek docility or the absence of the spirit of rebellion. In a pure Christianity peace is a state of mind, a freedom from external coercion. In its secondary sense it means a harmonious life coupled with a perfect adjustment to viroal conditions. Force and peace are contrasts, the one being the essence of political domination; the other is a rule of conscience, a flow of feeling and the joy of adjustment.

Discipline as a political concept means a subordination of interest and life to some superior: to those accepting the pure Christian view it means a unity of action for common ends with

nothing of the docility aristocracies have forced on the world. Courage is a tribal impetus to kill and hate or it is the will to resist aggression thus making conscience and duty controlling motives. No group have met death more courageously than have the Christian martyrs of all ages. They die not for party or clan but that "all may live and have life more abundantly." Such is the essence of our religious inheritance and the conflict that rages within it between the discipline of love and of war. It is the rule of oriental despots over against the freedom of emotion and conscience.

As in religion, so in government we find a composite view contending with pure concepts that are the outcome of our racial experience. Representative government is our great contribution to the thought of the world. Our victories have been those of thought over force and yet the advocates of brutal suppression are always present and in times of danger force measures on a reluctant people that their better judgment opposes. We are too close on the arrogant suppression of the South during the Reconstruction epoch or similar atrocities committed by England in Ireland to be blind to what forceful methods do when race or party passion gets the upper hand. Yet no American would point to this epoch nor is there any Englishman who would declare that similar deeds in Ireland represented the flower of our civilization. We do not always rise to the full height of our possibilities, but the trend of our civilization is against the suppression of thought and freedom. It is this record and its benefits that our excited martial friends, yearning for a return of old methods, would have us repudiate. Force, they think, must be used when persuasion fails to bring immediate results.

Before discussing the need of thus reversing our cherished notions a third element in our cultural advance should be formulated. Here we find a principle scarcely recognized which must in time become the corner-stone of democratic culture. Home Rule is a term we apply to Ireland and as states rights has had a place in American thought yet these notable instances are but examples of the new way of making public decisions and of securing popular control of our diverse activities. As the state grows it takes on economic functions; these must be distributed between the nation and locality in a way that narrows the scope of national domination and broadens that of local control. The community is the old

tribe revived under new conditions which should be given a chance to develop and bear its legitimate fruit. Local uniformity differs from national coercion in that the person can choose his group; when among the like-minded he can intensify its feeling and attain his cherished ends without thwarting the like desires and aims of other persons. The freedom of the person is not the freedom of anarchy but a freedom in choosing his residence. His town, his trade, his cultural institutions dominate him not through force but through their attractive power.

These are the maxims of the new patriotism, the flower of democratic advance. It means that every region has its common interests and the right to advance them by group action. The doctrine of state rights is a crude expression of a great principle partially seen and often wrongly applied. Our larger states are dwarfed nations that use coercion with as little restraint as an Eastern potentate. Their minor powers should be given to the locality and the broader economic functions given over to the nation. Then we might with truth claim to be a democracy and inaugurate a rule of love instead of force. The nation's power would then be limited to fields where our interests evoke our assent while each locality would be a group of like-minded persons among whom a common culture could be attained by the growth of higher motives. It is these ideals that our supermen, our incipient aristocracy, our military enthusiasts would destroy or at least contend that they will fail to carry us safely through the present world crisis.

Nor are the advocates of controlled peace in a better position although their philosophical errors come from another source. The real victory that our culture has won is different from what they assume. We have progressed not as majorities enforce their mandates at the expense of minorities but in proportion as rights are accorded to such minorities. It is the dominant who yield in each new elevation of culture. We change from a material control to a spiritual control as majorities cease to impose their will on their opponents. The real victory of the North in our Civil War was not when Lee surrendered but when Northern soldiers were withdrawn from the South to permit the former rebels to control their local governments. In the Boer war the victory was in the restoration of the Boers to power and not in their forced submission. The Catholic emancipation and Irish Home Rule marks epochs of prog-

ress that overtop the defeat of Napoleon. It is not enforced peace, but enforced restraints of majority action that is our glory. We are rightly proud of our bills of rights and constitutions but what are they but restraints on majority actions. Shall we violate this glorious record by imposing our ideas and political mechanisms on unwilling nations or shall we permit them to solve their own problems in their own way?

It is an essential thought in all peace propaganda that tribal animosities should be displaced and that groupal emotions should be reorganized around new centers. These emotions find a fitting outlet in home and city life where their full expression is in harmony with the larger units with which they should coöperate. Groupal feelings thus have their direction altered, but the ultimates of human nature that lie back of them are unaltered even if unfelt. In emergencies their force is unabated, essentially sound and protective. The most fundamental of these is self-protection. In a crisis the instinct of self-preservation rightfully dominates and its decisions are not adverse to peace but its best mainstay. What I do because I must, always excites admiration and never distrust or animosity. It is the premeditated injury that is resented and becomes the basis of indignation if personal, and of race feuds if national.

Every man and nation must at times exercise instinctive defense which must be judged by the momentary situation and is highly moral if the motive is self-protection. It is one thing instinctively to resent an insult to wife or child and quite another to carry arms for fear they may be insulted. If everyone carries arms to avenge insults or to uphold honor, more people would be killed in useless disputes and for imaginary insults than would be saved from real injury. Consciously to prepare is to degrade social life to the level of a border town. With nations also it is they who go fully armed that invite trouble, not those who rely on instinctive protection. The present war is a good illustration of how preparedness adds fuel to passions and makes conflict inevitable. Vigorous instinctive self-defense is moral and righteous. Often bold and seeming arbitrary decisions must be made and severe penalties must be enforced. But the decision and the enforcement must be instinctive coming from an aroused spirit of humanity and not from musty codes or antiquated precedents. The case is given away as

soon as argument or threat begins. Such cases, however, will be few. The mainstay of peaceful measures lies in the opposite plan of a thorough understanding and of a conscious yielding of many legitimate rights so as to gain the most essential ends. Even our wrong opponent has himself been wronged and these wrongs must be righted before we seek to impose a penalty.

In primitive communities isolated from each other and without industrial intercourse the conflicts are over favorite areas or arise from race hatreds. The antagonisms between tribes and nations are thus fierce and frequent while the social bonds are weak or non-existent. Defense is therefore urgent; an appeal to common ideals impossible. That religion and morality under these conditions should become tribal is perhaps necessary. It was inevitable that martial ideas should become mixed with the real tenets of our religion and this gives an historical basis for a militant church. But this justification has lost its basis. Commerce and industry have bound the world into a homogeneous unit. Economics can be trusted to uphold universal peace and give it a better basis than martial ideals. The real protection of each nation is the interest other nations have in its welfare. Thought is now based on universal premises that all accept and on policies tested by recent experience. When to these are added the influences an enlightened self-interest imposes, we have a basis of peace that only some fierce revival of tribal emotions can break. Steadily these new forces are gaining the upper hand and so modify our emotions that morality and culture make a common appeal and buttress each other in the suppression of primitive passions. Religion can thus free itself from the gospel of hate and purify itself from the dross of martial concepts.

We must not, however, go too far or too fast. There are negative factors that demand consideration in the formation of a national policy which if neglected make more trouble than if consciously faced. The most persistent of these is fear which is all the more dangerous when without any basis. America today may not be in danger of invasion and yet a panic of fear may be fanned into active existence by a sensational press from vague rumors. A vivid description of how New York may be captured can upset the nerves of the nation without a single foe being in sight. Just as locking doors at night makes one feel safe even if it is no guarantee of safety,

so national defense is necessary, not so much to ward off danger as to suppress our inherited timidity. The problem of national defense thus becomes a legitimate one even to one who feels no danger and who believes that religious, moral and economic forces are our best safeguards.

The difference between a pacifist and an emotional patriot is not in the fact of defense but in the bases on which it should rest. Two of these bases are sound even in most advanced nations: first, the best defence is an instinctive defense based on our primary reactions and not on premeditated plans. The prepared nations will get into trouble oftener, do more bluffing and suffer more in the end than they who act only when they see some wrong is committed. Be sure there is some clearly defined cause and then act quickly at any cost until the end is attained. The action of the North in our Civil War is a good example of the virtues and failures of instinctive defense. No one would deny that this action was wiser and more democratic than would have been any amount of conscious military preparation. But something is involved in instinctive defense which most people overlook when the principle is applied to national affairs. No preconceived restraints, no traditional policy, no antique notion of law or right should check the alertness or vigor of effective national protection. Any real danger must be instantaneously guarded against not merely by negative measures but by positive attack.

The second principle is that for America, a naval defense is much cheaper and more effective than is a military defense. A serious mistake is made when military and naval defense are assumed to involve the same principles. A naval war could be carried to a successful conclusion without any disturbance of industrial life. We need submarines and fast cruisers, not battleships. If we had the fastest cruisers no fleet could approach our shore. It is the transports in the rear and not the battleships in the front that are the real danger. How could a foreign army be transported across the sea if our ships were fast and our submarines efficient? The popular picture of a naval fight is that of two groups of battleships struggling for the mastery. But why should we submit to such a test? To fight effectively is to make the ocean dangerous and not to use up all our strength in one naval battle. A discussion between two admirals as to the tactics of a recent naval review illustrates this

principle. The umpire decided against the fleet defending our coast on the ground that its commander divided his fleet to gain the rear of the invader instead of fighting an open battle for the mastery of the sea. The difference between the "stand up and fight" policy and a Fabian policy is as old as warfare. Which of the two is superior can be determined only by the actual conditions in a given case. It is important, however, to notice that the "stand up and fight" policy, noble as it seems, would cost the country billions of dollars, and if its one glorious battle went against us would expose us to tremendous losses. The other policy would not prevent some small city from being destroyed but would prevent any serious invasion. An umpire of the sort in command of a battleship might do himself honor, but the naval defense of America ought to be entrusted to other hands. The real fighting should be done a thousand miles from our shore by single ships that can strike unexpected blows and successfully escape if faced by a superior force. Such a defense would not be costly. Less men and money would be demanded than we now pay. But to be effective, naval action must not be hampered by technicalities that make instinctive defense impossible. The evil of the rules of naval warfare that our President seeks to establish is that they would take from us our most effective means of defense when a real danger arises and make a large army necessary to protect our harbors. If unhampered, our present naval budget would give protection against every nation but England. It is not our own shores that are costly to defend, but our outlying possessions and their defense demands a change of policy rather than more expenditure.

Two policies are open to the United States. We may give up the Monroe Doctrine and yield our outlying possessions. Then our defense by fast cruisers and submarines is simple, effective, and not burdensome. But if we wish to retain the Monroe Doctrine, defend the Philippines and influence China or adopt any other aggressive policy, our problem becomes the same as that of England and demands a joint control of all oceans. England's supremacy at sea has not been questioned during the present war nor has she been in any real danger of invasion. It is only her entangling alliances on the continent that cause her present troubles and have brought out her deficiencies. A joint control of the ocean by Britain and America means no increase of present naval expenses and would permit



a large decrease of army expenditure. Such a policy would mean the dividing the world into two parts, one of which would be under Anglo American control. This would include the British Isles, America, Africa, India and Australasia. All these can be made safe by a control of the sea. They form a natural unit where democratic ideals have ample scope for expansion. If we put the defense of our ideals above our material needs an alliance with Britain is the only logical procedure. Their defense and ours must run along the same lines and demand a full control of the seas. He is an enemy to our liberty who contests this control and his schemes must be thwarted without delay.

To restate this thought in more general terms there are three fundamental psychological reactions that statesmen neglect at their peril. They are instinctive defense, instinctive fear and the instinctive yearning for groupal relations. Our political philosophy tries to make us think of ourselves as individuals, but it is a defective philosophy at best and mere intellectual dillettantism in its ordinary forms. From this philosophy we are breaking and natural groups, home, church, school, trade, locality, and nation are being formed that dominate the individual in spite of himself. For the same reason any cosmopolitan scheme is without any vital force and would be disregarded when groupal interests oppose its formulas. In culture, language and institutions our groupal feelings bind us to England and it will be easy to form the adjustment, political and economic, that will give this groupal feeling full play. But a controlled peace for the whole world is a paper scheme based on false principles. It would involve us in difficulties instead of avoiding them. But if we act groupally our defense must be instinctive, safe and practical. We cannot be a Don Quixote defending small nations or antiquated political concepts. Nor can we be controlled by a maudlin sentimentality that prevents effective defense or makes it costly. We need to guard our culture, our liberty and our institutions as effectively as do the Germans and have the same lofty ideal of the subordination of the person to the state. But we want an Anglo American state free from the taint of military domination.

The principle of national preservation is not different from, but is in essence the same as, that of individual self-defense. It is supreme in moments of peril and to it for the time all else is to be

subordinated. What we need is not its denial but its stern application to our present perils and needs. Shall we, aroused by sentimental emotions, try to protect a few excursionists whose curiosity leads them into the war zone, or shall we say that the control of the sea is as vital to our liberty as is the control of land to Germany and give warning to all nations that we do not mean to remain passive if a hostile nation threatens our integrity? Where does the defense of America begin—three miles from our own coast or three miles from the Japanese, German or any other coast from which a national peril may loom? Shall we go to antiquated principles of international law for the basis of our defense, or to the instinctive reactions that nature has planted in our heredity? Shall our defense conform to our psychological inheritance or to our paper philosophies? Any foreign policy is wrong that conflicts with ultimate realities and seeks to put up barriers that in the hour of national peril we would be forced to repudiate. It is only fair that we give others the same right of instinctive defense that we will demand for our own defense. Present yielding will give future stability. Better a temporary loss than the establishment of false principles.

The vital point in this position turns on the difference between military and naval defense. The one is a useless extravagance, a menace to national liberty, and would be a blot on our culture. To impose a military discipline on the American people would be to imitate the worst features of German civilization, with all the evils we deplore. The docility of the trained conscript is the real danger. We have enough of this personal humility and servility without enforcing it by a national discipline. Naval defense does not involve these dangers. The expense need not be above our present expenditure if the cost of the army is kept within proper bounds. Should England and America unite in a common defense, large sums could be saved. It is not our defense but the attempted control of other civilizations that would debase our ideals and in the end lead to bankruptcy.

The essence of this position is that our culture rests on five distinct principles which often conflict but yet have in time been blended into a harmonious whole. These are Instinctive Defense, Brother Love, Representative Government, Home Rule and Economic Interests. Thinkers and writers arrive at different conclusions as they give emphasis to some of these principles at the expense

of others. The main distinction, however, is between those whose thought is purely a result of national experience or of older thought verified by recent events, and those whose minds are so cramped by book knowledge that actual experience seems but a defective guide. The hybrid thinker knows much of Greece, Rome, Germany, France and Russia and goes to them for his ultimate catagories. Or, he accepts a view that elevates English thought to a dogmatic eminence and thus neglects the vital reactions of the American people. While akin to the English, our view and experience is really saner than theirs, because less disturbed by abnormal conditions and antiquated traditions.

Our ultimate choices are therefore simple and make only one of two alternatives sane and rational. We must either emphasize Brotherly Love and rely on its winning power or we must take Instinctive Defense and Economic Interests as our guides. With love as a dominating principle, we can remain in isolation, relying on Good Will and International Brotherhood for our protection. Should these fail or seem likely to be insufficient, an alliance with England is the only practical defense open to us. Her problems are the same as ours; her culture is our culture and her defense involves the same measures which we must adopt. Together we could defend one half of the world without any resort to a military discipline that would be destructive to liberty and economic prosperity. The world would be then divided into three economic zones, Anglo American, Continental Europe and Eastern Asia. There could thus arise three isolated civilizations with economic interests that would not seriously collide. It is only when we seek to stretch our control over antagonistic races or seek to dispute their ascendancy on their own territory that we evoke formidable opposition and thus force on ourselves the need of a military organization more destructive to ourselves than to our foes. The great evil in the world is not war but the docility that martial discipline imposes. It is better to be free than to be dominant, even if the latter has the glitter of world uniformity.

This new patriotism I would define as *National Pacifism*. The contrast is a triple one in which the brooding alarmist is at one pole and the international socialist at the other. The middle ground is a national organization quieting instinctive fear and promoting industrial efficiency. By increasing income, by coöperative living,

and by spreading justice, our emotional nature is brought into harmony with culture, science, and brother love. As men sink below the normal their fear, hate, and passion rise as awesome specters. There is a like danger from a dominance of the intellect. Rationalism, utilitarianism, cosmopolitanism, and other varieties of international thought create an opposition between heredity and culture. No one can be properly called a pacifist who ignores human nature so completely as to make it rebel against his schemes. More than the meager ties of speculative thought are needed to bind men in effective units. The national, the local, and the economic are the forces through which our heredity has developed, and they alone are capable of firmly protecting normal life. To them we must look for the broader view and solid basis on which our advancing culture may rest. Race, hate, and fear disappear when normal men are reorganized along economic lines. The old patriotism had them as its main agents; the new must be their bitter foe. Brother love and economic coöperation are the two elements which, united, give the true basis of nation and patriotism.